In this paper, there is an attempt to construct the notion of interstijectivity as a process of a coorakztion of participants' contributions in joint activity. This notion incorporates the dynamics of bothagreement anddisagreement. Iargue thata traditionaldejbitionof intersubjectivityasastate of overlap of individual unakstandings overemphasizes agreement and&-emphasizes disagreement among the participants in joint activity. It disregards disagreement at two levels: I) byfocusing only on integrative, consensus seeking, activities, in which disagreement among participants of joint activity often is viewed as only the initial point of the joint activity that has to be resolved by the final agreement (macro-level), and2) by considering disagreements as only nuisances or obstacles while focusing on integrative activities (micro-level). To illustrate how disagreement can constitute intersubjectivity at macro-andmicro-levels, examples of children'sdevelopment of a classroom play are examined. Diversity andjlui&y of intersubjectivity will be &cussed.
In this paper, I argue that in the traditional definition of the concept of intersubjec tivity, agreement among participants, is overemphasized while disagreement is de-emphasized. This emphasis on agreement orients researchers to focus only on particular agreement-bounded phenomena in sociocultural activities and to dismgard other aspects of the phenomena, such as non-integrative activities (macro-level) and non-integrative elements of integrative activities (micro-level). I argue that disagreement and agreement are both aspects of one process rather than separate phases of microdevelopment of sociocultural activity portrayed as progressing from disagreement (or a lack of agreement) to agreement among the participants. Each aspect ofthe process cannot be fully understood without understanding the other. In this paper, the main question discussed is not so much how understanding among people becomes possible, but what forms dynamic understanding can take.
Here, I will try to develop a coherent notion of intersubjectivity that appreciatesboth agreement and disagreement among the participants in so&cultural activity. In doing so, I will consider several examples of sociocultural activities where evidence of disagreement as a characteristic of the intersubjectivity process is clear and central for the activities: straight speech durgi in Israel (Katriel, 1986) . learning disability in schools (Mehan, 1993) . and children's playcrafting (Baker-Sennett, Matusov, & Rogoff, 1992) .
Goes. Bt Pino, 1995; WaIlace. l%l; Wats&& Toma, 1995). Many anthqobgbts. sociologists, amd, more recently. psychologists, argue against anexclusive focus on agreement (i.e., 'sharing") among individuals involved in so&cultural pmctica and suggest alternative concqs for captkng a unity of diverse participants in so&cultural activities, such as "organization of diversity" (Wallace, 1961 Rogoff (1994, ms) strused the importance of both agreement and tigreemait in her dcftition of culture:
Members of a community are not homogcnaxrs. They do not have pra5sely he same points of view, practices, backgrounds, or goals. Rather, they mepmt of a coodinated orpnization. They often are in complementay rol~playing parts that fit together rather than being identical-or in contested relationships with each other. disagreeing about some features of their own roles or community direction while requiring some common ground that community members share (even if they contest it) that I regard as cultme. (p.15; italics added)
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that intersubjectivity is more usefully defined as a process of coordination of individual participation in joint sociocuhural activity rather than as a relationship of correspondence of individuals' actions to each other.
Traditionally,intersubjectivityhasbeen&~~asastateofoverlappingindividual"subjectivities" or "prolepses" (Rommetveit, 1979 (Rommetveit, ,1985 . The term" prolepsis" refers to a communicative move in which a speaker presupposes or takes for granted something that has not yet been discussed by the time ofthemove. Forexample,ptoIepsiscantalrethefo~ofthespealrer'sassumptionsabouttheIistener's background knowledge of the topic. about the listener's perception of how serious the conversation is, and so on. Intersubjectivity is achieved when participants of an activity have similar prolepses. Although researchers who traditionally focus predominantly on agreement and shared presuppositions may keep in mind limitations of such approach that may lead to the following implicit forms of reductionism: 1) intersubjectivity is viewed as a state of symmetry among individuals; 2) intersubjectivity is re&ced to individual subjectivity (i.e., prolepsis) via comparison of individual subjectivities (prolepses); 3) joint activity is regarded as a simple sum ofindividual activizies; and 4) joint ac tivity progressesfrom heterogeneity to increasing symmetry among the individuaI$ perspectives and prolepses.
The new approach to intersubjectivity does not reject traditional research or studied phenomena, but mther raises new questions, points out new phenomena, and provides different explanations. Traditional and participatory approaches to intersubjectivity generate important implications for both conceptual frameworks and research methodology. The traditional approach based on the notion of "sharing" (understood as overlapping, "having in common" such as "shared understanding") seems to limit researchers to study only consensus-oriented activities and to focus on M of unification of the participants' subjectivities (Smolka, De Goes, & Pino, 1995) . Unlike the traditional approxh, the participatory approach allows researchers to study any joint activity-conxnsus -and nonconsensus-oriented (such as dispute, fights, etc.)--and focuses on how the participants coordinate their contributions in the joint activity through agreements and disagreements.
traditional and participatory notions of intersubjectivity, and providing examples of sociocultural activities that are not consensus-oriented. Finally, I will analyze children's playcrafting activity to ilbrstrate the participatory notion of intersubjectivity as a process of coordination of participants' contributions.
Intersubjectivity as "Having in Common" Versus as Coordination
What happens in a sociocultural activity when participants have different goals, prolepses, and mciemandings of the situation? A traditional appmch ad&ems this question at the level of individual action by referring to some constructed "common" or "shared" action that reconciles the differences between participants' diverse goals, prolepses, and perceptions. However, in many cases, socioculturalactivity is constituted by adiversity of individual actions, and the reconciliation of these individual actions is not only undesired but can destroy the activity (e.g., the examples of dugri speech below). But how can the diversity of individual actions (i.e., goals, prolepses. and perceptions) unite people in the activity? To address this question it is necessary to shift the analysis from the level of individual action to the level of participatory contribution, from a focus on what each individual actor tries to accomplish to a focus on how individual contributions are coordinamd with each other during the activity.
Traditionally, inter-subjectivity has been defmed as sharing subjectivities among participants. Hem the term "sharing" refers to both 'having in common" and "dividing up" (Cole, 1991) .' I argue that this narrow definition of intersubjectivity can lead to a static comparison of individuals (e.g., their action, perspectives. goals) and the collapsing of individuals into each other by focusing only on what is in wmmon among them. It assumes that in creasing homogeneity of participants in a joint activity is the outcome of the activity (Len&e, 1995) . Anthropologist Hannerz (1992) called for an alternative approach that embraces diversity:
Rather than trying to fin& somewhere in the structure of social relations, a cxxnmon denominator for the widest possible range of cultural phenomena-an emeqrise which even in its more successful versions tends to be quite incomplete in its coverage-I am interested here in the sources of diversity, andinirsconsequences. ThisisamaaerofconfrantingawtomluycommitmenSinanthropologyand elsewhere, to one particular understanding of culture as collective, socially organized meaning-the idea of culture as something stied, in the sense of homogeneoudy distdmted in society. @Al)
'Ihe metaphor of sharing as "having in common" implies intersubjectivity in a sociocubural activity as a process of unifying or standardizing all the participants' contributions. According to this approach, "to share subjectivities" means that all the participants hold the same vision of activity in terms of what and how to act, so that they can act as one individual. Semiotician Lotman (1988) referred to the unification of individual viewpoints as the first function of text (i.e.. any semiotic corpus that has significance, see Wertsch & Toma, 1995) . He wrote, "the frrst function [of text] is fulfilIed best when codes of the speaker and the listener most completely coincide and consequently, when the text has the maximum degree of univocality" (Lotman, 1988, p. 34) . However, it is impossible to achieve a complete overlap of psychological perceptions of a situation despite the commonality of the participants' biological equipment, cultural history, and experience of physical sunoundings because of the process that constitutes unique individual experience (e.g., each time each person uniquely experiences the sourness of a lemon). It is also doubtful that the core interest that people have in each other is to "sbam" something (i.e., to unify or even, pushed to an extreme, to collapse into each other) (Wallace, 1961) . As Lounan (1988) pointed out, the fmt function of text does not exist without the second function of creating new meanings.
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The second function of text is te generate llcw meanings. In this respect a text ceases to be a passive link in conveying some constant information between inpt (sender) eld output (receiver). Whereas in the fmt case a difference between the message at the input and that at the output of an information circuit can occur only ss a result of a defect in the commtications channel, a4 is to be attributed to the tahical imperfections of this system, in the saxmd use such a difference is the very essence of text's function as a Thinking device.'* What from the fmst standpoint is a defec& from the second is a nom and vice versa. (pp. [36] [37] The methodology of the traditional understanding of intersubjectivity as sharing is based on a comparison of individuals' actions through observation or by asking the participants themselves about the degree to which they agreed with each other in their joint activity (e.g., Kelly-Byrne, 1984; Leadbeater, 1988) . This overlapping of individual understandings is regarded as constituting intersubjectivity in the object of the joint activity (e.g., "shared" focus of attention), intersubjectivity in communication (i.e., individuals' agreement about their engagement in communication). and intersubjectivity in metacommunication (i.e., individuals* agreement about the nature of the communication-joking vs. serious conversation) (G&E& 1993) . In this approach, individuals are often considered to be separated born each other with boundaries and involved in dyadic Ping-Pang type interaction, with reduction of culture to societal tools and social partners (see Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner. 1993 , as an example of such an approach, and Rogoff, Chavajay, & Matusov, 1993 , for a critique of it). Traditional research on the micro-development of intersubjectivity usually proceeds from defining an initial overlap in individuals'understandings of the activity object, activity communication, and metacommunication, to a description of how this overlap has increased in joint activity, as in the case of adult-child guidance (see Wertsch, 1979 Wertsch, .1984 
as examples).1
Iftheoverlappinghasnotincreased.itisoftencansideredas evidenceforalackofintersubjectivity (Goncill993). An example of a lack of understanding that was considered a lack of intersubjectivity can be drawn from Corsaro's (1983) observation of a 3-yearold girl, whose bid for pretend play reconstructing her experience of viewing her baby brother on a TV screen was rejected by her friends because they were unfamiliar with the girl's experience. Here the lack of common experience inhibited joint activity. However, a lack of understanding does not automatically lead to a lack of intersubjectivity. In the playcrafting study (Baker-Sennett, IvIatusov, & Rogoff, 1992 ). children's different experiences with different versions of the traditional fairy tale Snow Whire led them to intensive disputes and discussions that underwent different productive phases of the process of intersubjectivity.
Bruner (1983) implicitly suggested a good criterion for detecting the process of intersubjectivity: intersubjectivity lasts as long as joint activity. In his example, a physicist mother and her 4-year-old child probably do not have identical notions of "electricity," however, it does not matter for their conversation about electrical shocks to continue. Because immediate joint activity is embedded in and overlapped with other joint activity with different people, in different time and circumstances, bigger joint activities last and, thus, bigger intersubjectivity lasts even when specific joint activity is over. Intersubjectivity involves and exceeds immediate joint activity in the form of resuIting experience from the joint activity: the participants learned new skills. roles, knowledge that are stiII coordinated with the former joint activity. Recall the 3-year-old girl who unsuccessfully tried to involve children in her pretend play-it was possible that the girl learned the need to explain her previous experience to the children. oc to choose a theme for pretend play that would be more familiar to other children, or to go to play with adults who can easily adjust and facilitate the play, or to avoid bidding for play, and so on. Thus. even an unsuccessful bid for joint activity, or interrupted joint activity,canprovideabasisforfutureco<Hdinationofparticipantwnaibutionsandthus intersubjectivity.
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Smolka, De Goes, and Pino (1995) strongly argue that misunderstandings, c&Xc& "divergent perspectives, opposition of ideas, resistance to communication, and othex disharmonious instances" (p. 172) should not he viewed as failed attempts at intersubjectivity but as special forms of intersubjectivity. This view was also supported by many social psychologists who studied group dynamics and conflict resolution (Deutsch, 1973 (Deutsch, : L.ewin, 1948 . In the alternative, participatory perspective on intersubjectivity, differences, disagreements, and misunderstandings among the participants are no less relevant to the joint activity than similarities, agreements. and understandings (Blanco, 1995 : Hawkins, 1987 Lemke, 1995; SmoDca, De Goes, & Pino. 1995 : Wertsch, del Rio, & Ahartz, 1995 .
'IBe participatoq notion of intersubjectivity as a coordbmtion of individual contributions to the joint activity allows researcherstoincorporatebothparticipants'understandingsandmisunderstandings of each other, and their similarities and differences as the participants are simultaneously in agreement and disagreement. Moreover, at the bottom of any agreemen there is a momentary disagreement that promotes communication (otherwise, people would not need to communicate) and it is the dynamic for change in the activity. Similarly, at the bottom of any disagreement, there is an agreement that grounds the disagreement. Agreements and disagreements provide the basis for dynamics at the micro level of the joint activity as well as at more global levels (Lotman, 1988) . For instance. a prosecutor and a defender in court do not usually seek consensus with each other but are involved in persuasive argumentation for the judge and jury who coordinate the prosecutor's and the defender's contributions in court argumentaLion (see Stein & Miller, 1993 for more discussion of this case). I argue that intersubjectivity as a coordina&ion of individual contributions in joint activity more accurately captures the dialectic relationship between understanding and misunderstanding in joint activity than does intersubjectivity as sharing.
Role of Intersubjectivity in Sociocultural Activities
The intersubjectivity process organizes individual goal-directed efforts in joint activity. In the psychological literature, intersubjectivity is usually referred to in three sequential moments of joint activity: the beginning, the intermediate, and the end (Cervantes, personal communication, November 1993; see also Smolka, De Goes, & Pino, 1995) . 'The beginning moment is about having common backgrounds that participants are engaged in before joining the communication. From this point of view, intersubjectivity preexists or should be established before a specific joint activity and is a precondition of any meaningful communication (Brazelton, 1983; Rogoff, 1990 , Trevarthen, 1979 Wells & Chang-Wells, 1992) . The intermediate moment of intezsubjectivity is about creating a common ground of engagement among the participants who are directly invo1ve.d in the joint activity. Here, intersubjectivity is defmed in tenr~s of mutual understanding and engagement in participants' definitions of the situation (i.e.. their perceptions and understandings of the situation) and sensitivity toeachother'sperspectivesoftheongoingjointactivity (Clark& Haviland, 1977; Rommetveit. 1985 : Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978 Wertsch, 1979 Wertsch, .1984 . The end moment is about a common outcome of thejointactivity, whatislearnedintheactivity byallthe participants. In thismoment,intersubjectivity is defined as updated common background such as a child learning from a caregiver how to consider and perform a task (Wertsch, 1984) .
Different researchers emphasize different moments of intersubjectivity in joint activity. For example. Wells and Chang-Wells (1992) were primarily interested in the preudhkms of joint classroom activity, in having a common background and channel of communication by the participants. Murray and Trevarthen (1985) focused more on the emerging intersubjectivity in the mothw-
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infant joint activity and showed that 6-to lZwe&old infants coordinated their movements and established eye contact with their mothers in live face-to-face interaction mediated by video equipment, but the infants turned away and showed signs of distress when they were presented with a video replay of their mothers' interactions with them. Wertsch (1979) concennated on the intermediate and the end moments of intersubjectivity in joint activity by looking at the growing commonality of participants' deftitions of the situation. and the outcome of guidance as the child becomes an independent problem solver during sessions where a mother helped a 2-year-old boy work a puzzle. Piaget's theory of perspective taking defmed intersubjectivity as an outcome of socie cognitive conflict resolution (Fomutn, 1987; Rogoff, 1990 , Tudge & Rogoff, 1989 . focusing on the end moment-intersubjectivity as outcome of the joint activity.
It appears that the phenomenon of intersubjectivity transcends any specific and time-limited joint activity-it is not only the basis and derivative of the joint activity but also the social glue of different socioculmral activities. For example, a 4-year-old child joining pretend play with her playmates has already been engaged in general scripts of pretend play with their conventional metacommunicative rules separating fictitious and real worlds as well as in many diverse so&cultural practices that can be available material for the pretend play (e.g., family chores. school, shopping routines) (Gk%l, 1993) . Through participation in sociocuItuml practices mediati by other people organized in social groups and institutions and by sociocultural tools (e.g., books, computexs, technologies, goods), people establish intersubjectivity without direct contact with each other.' This function of intersubjectivity as the social glue of sociocultuml activities makes possible the development of communicative discourses, languages, and finally cultures that constitute the global so&cultural and historical fabric of the human world Studies on Intersubjectivity: Socio-Cognitive Conflict and Cultural Guidance.
Historically, there have been two strong conceptual traditions in developmental psychology that focus on intersubjectivity in joint activity. First, the theory developed by Piaget and his followers focused mainly on the role of disagreement in sociocognitive confkts that promote development of qualitatively new cognitive forms of actions in children, Second, the theory developed by Vygotsky and his followers primarily emphasized the role of agreement about cultural goals, means, and functions in cultural guidance. Both these conceptual traditions have been interested in how a gap in individual understanding of the situation among the participants has been covered in a joint activity.
The Piagetian notion of intersubjectivity is based on the idea of cognitive decentering through perspective taking. According to the notion of perspective taking, an individual in joint activity has to deal with not only his/her own perspective on problem solving but also with the perspectives of the other participants as well. When the individual perspectives differ, it might cause a sock-cognitive conflict in the individuals (disequilibktttt). The socio-cognitive conflict is based on disagreements among the participants and might occur in several participants during the activity and is intensified by the participants' constant communication. It can lead to mutual understanding between the participants and usually to a new, more correct and, thus, advanced, perspective shared by the participants. This new perspective is shared due to the assumption of universality of wgnitive process in each individual.
There were many studies in the 1970s and 1980s that explored Piagetian theory about the role of xx&cognitive conflict for cognitive and moral development (see for example, Ames & Murray, 1982; Doise, Mugny, & Perret-Clermont, 1975; Light & Glachan, 1985; Mugny & Doise, 1978) . Johnson (1989) performed a me&analysis of studies on cognitive and moral reasoning in joint activity and concluded that "these studies provided evidence that disagreements among members of cooperative gmups can promote transitions to higher stages of cognitive and moral reasoning" (p. (Forman, 1992; Miller, 1987, Stein, Bemas, Calicchia, & Wright, in press; Stein & Miller, 1993) . There hasbaenalsogrowinginterestinstudyingtheprocessandroleofconflictsinpeerrehtio~ (Hartup, Laursen, Stewart+ & Eas&nson, 1988; Shak. 1993; Youniss & Volpe, 1978) .
The Vygotskian notion of intersubjectivity is based on the premise that interpsychological processes of wmmmdcation precede the process of intemakation, and through it are transformed into intrapsychological processes of an individual's self-regulation. Higher mentat functions of memory, counting, reading, and so on initially exist in social interaction and are distributed among the participants. Through leaming so&cultural tools (e.g.. system of written signs, numerical system, maps, and so on) in joint activity, individuals become capable of producing higher mental functions completely by themselves. Intersubjectivity develops from the earliest and most peripheral form of individual participation in joint activity, where a higher mental function is distributed among the participants. to a full possession of a cultmally advanced mental function by the individuaL Here the individual processes are regulated by socially distributed functions defined by culture (Wertsch, 1985) . The highest level of intersubjectivity is achieved when a child takes over full responsibility for the task from a culturaUy more advanced partner and performs the whole task by he&imseif without needing the partner anymore. Individual mastery of working alone is the final aim of individual microgenesis in joint activity. Growing interest in Vygotsky's theory in the 1980s led to a variety of studies focused on guidance in support of Vygotsky's claims that working with a more capable parmer provides an access toculturalfunctionsforachiid (seeforexampleEllis&Rogoff, 1986; KoesterBrBueche. 1980; McL.ane, 1987; Radz&zewska & Rogoff, 1988) .
However, the researcher-designed structure of the joint activities in their labs often remained unnoticed for the researchers in the 1970s and 1980s. These activities were usually structured in such a way so as to be with only one (non-negotiable) goal and with the task unilaterally connolled by the researchers. Typically, tbe activities were consensus-oriented and were supposed to end with agreement among the participants (including the researcher). If agreement did not occur, the researchers often considered the joint activity a failure (see Smolka, De Goes, & Pino, 1995; Wertsch, de1 Rio, & Alvarez, 1995 for more discussion and critique of this methodology and conceptual framework). In addition, the organization of the highly-controlled experiments on conflict and guidance in the psychological labs was promoted by the academic requirements of the experimental methodology of that time (this structure of activities also looked suspiciously similar to those in tmditional school institutions). ?he researcher's own participation in the institution of academia often remained transparent and, thus, unseen for the researcher (Rogoff, Radziszewska, & Masiello, 1995) . Part of the problem in psychology seems to be assuming an "objective" science independent from its institutional and cultural environment. When the researcher as an organizer of the joint activity in the lab (e.g.. testing. treatment) is considered to be included in the analysis of the experimental joint activity, it becomes clear that the assumptions about the unilateral, non-negotiable, academicallyrigorous nature of the experimental activity in psychological labs are questionable (Lave, 1988 ).
It appears that any joint activity has multiple agendas, goals, contexts, tasks, and actors with different intentions. It involves dynamics of agreements, disagreements, and coordination of partici-
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Without .-! yreemeru Eugene Matusov ,,w.m wIr~~~~u~~~. acause me researchers in the traditional experiments on conflict and guidance often tried to unilaterally cona the studied joint activity. the inherent nature of joint activity sazmed to escape the researchers' attention and was considered as a "nuisance" of the experimental setup. Such "nuisance" could involve participants' non-coqemtion with the researcher, their mis-or al~ativtunderstandingofthctask,andiortheirdcviationfromthewperimenter'stask. Italsocould involve means, themes, and agendas ti distant contexts and practices by the participants, different meanings of the experimenter-participants interaction for diffenznt participants, attempts to involve the researcher in the task, and so on (Elbers, Maier, Hocksha, & Hougsteden, 1992 , Hendrick, 1990 , Lave. 1988 Matusov, Bell. & Rogoff. submitted; Pent+ Clermont, Perret, & Bell, 1991; Smolka, De Goes, & Pino, 1995; van der Veer, Ijzendoom, & Valsiner, 1994) .
To take into account the inherently mult&ceted and sociocultural nature of activities in which people are involved, it would be much easier to study joint activities when they are not organized by the researchers. Starting from the second half of the 1980s. them has been an increasing number of studies on joint activities occurring in "naturalistic" institutional environments (often schools) without much control by the researcher (see, for example, Moll & Whitmore, 1993; Newman, Griffm, & Cole, 1989; Wells, 1990) . However, in considering "naturally" occurring activities, many of the studies have focused on either consensus-oriented ac tivities or consensus in activities (for an exception to the latter, see Wertsch & Toma. 1995) . This focus on consensus has limited researchers in their consideration of intersubjectivity processes.
Examples of Activities with Discord Coordination
Some cultural forms of discourse openly elaborate, institutionalize. and even ritualize such features of intersubjectivity as dynamic transformations of degrees of agreement and disagreement. Sociolinguist Kahiel(l986) described dugri speech (an approximate uanslation is "straight talk") in Israeli Sabra culture, discourse that is based on a direct confrontation of different paradigms. In this type of speech, participants seek notan agreement or reconciliation of their confronting positions, but rather their personal and community integrity. The dugri discourse usually announced by one of the participants at the beginning of the conversation ("1'11 tell you dugr?'), implies that the following confrontation will be beyond their personal idiosyncratic positions and will concern instead the collision of different paradigms existing in the community. That is why it is expected that the interpersonal nzlationship will be tightened after the dugri speech rather than be deteriorated. Katriel stressed that no change in the participants' position is expected in the course of (or after) the dugri speech; rather, they acknowledge their own and each other's stands. and thus reach more harmonious relations with themselves and their opponents. This harmony is based on acceptance, acknowledgment, and respect for differences, rather than on agreement and "sharing." Talking dugri is both a safe and risky business. It requires both a deep understanding and agreement about this discourse and a no less deep disagreement about matters of the talk. Through this paradoxical move, the community maintains itself through its own challenge. By talking dugri, a legitimate diversity of voices is established in the community.
Unlike intersubjectivity as sharing, the participatory notion of intersubjectivity is joint-activityoriented rather than individual-oriented. 'Ibe notion of individual contribution transcends the notion of individual perspective on the joint activity. 7his is especially evident in joint activity that is based on misunderstanding and misreading. The fact that individual contributions andintersubjectivity can transcend individual perspectives on joint activity opens up the possl%ility for the phenomenon of institutional and communal intersubjectivity separate from any individual intentionality. This phenomenon may be seen negatively as vicious circles, groupthink, and bureaucracy, or positively as unforeseen group or institutional development (Argyris & Schon, 1978) . In this phenomenon, the direction of the activity is not foreseen or desired by any of the participants: what participants refer to as an institutional or group consensus might be, in fact, a coordination of their contributions separated from any individual participant. For example, Mehan (1993) described a case in which an elementary school student was evaluated as having a learning disability despite confusing and contradictory data and even despite the will of some of the major participants in the decision making. Mehan specifically focused on three main players in the evene the student's mother, the student's teacher, and the school psychologist who produced three descriptions of the student's behavior based on three different voices.
What coo-all three (and other) voices were the circumstances of the meeting. It appears fromMehan'sdescriptionthatbeforethemeetingthemotherandthetezherhadbeenagainst labeling the student as disabled despite the fact that it was the teacher who initiated the process (there was a large lapse of time between the teacher's refenal and the meeting). The psychologist also had seemed not to be completely sure of the diagnosis of the boy as learning disabled. However. the event of the meeting was organized in such a way as to detect evidence of learning disability in the participants' discourse about the student. Any ambiguity in the stories as well as deviations from the listeners' expectations were automatically counted as evidence of the disability. The disability detection was what bounded and glued participants' contributions in the discourse. While presenting his or her story to the others, each participant tried to understand the student's behavior across different contexts (e.g., at home, in the classroom, at the testing lab) but, while listening to others, each participant was focused on determining signs of learning disability. In this case, intersubjectivity can be defined as the institutionalktion of lezningdisability.
In these examples, the dynamic unity of individual contributions in the joint activity defmes intersubjectivity. Unlike individual perspectives on the activity (in Piagetian terms-see Forman, 19922: Johnson &Johnson, 1989) . where each individual perspective makes sense on its own without needing to know the perspectives of other participants, individual contributions to the joint activity mutually constitute each other and do not make sense without taking into consideration the whole ongoing activity.
The gap between individual perspectives on the activity and individual contributions to the joint activity constitutes the zone of proximal development for the participants of the joint activity. According to the traditional view on intersubjectivity, this gap decreases during joint activity, which is considered to be evidence for increasing intersubjectivity and leaming. However, in the alternative participatory approach, this gap is simultaneously decreasing in one regard and increasing in another (but perhaps not to the same degree). The child who learns new sociocultural tools, such as gesture communication, language, literacy, etc., not only decreases possibilities for cultural misunderstanding with people of her community, but also increases them. Vygotsky's (1978) example of writing development provides a good illusuation of this: when a child's scribbles are reduced to the letters by the teacher, the child gets a new opportunity to express and work, with her ideas on paper, which provides new areas and levels of l&her-child misunderstanding that might have been impossible before [cf. Valsiner's (1987) notion of canalization of development].
The traditional concept of intersubjectivity as sharing stresses reproductive aspects of learning and culture as a whole at the expense of their productive, creative aspects. This notion of sharing is designed to describe stable. preservative trends in the culture. It is very difficult to use this notion to
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Eugene Matusov describe how something new develops inajointactivity and explain an emerging diversity among the participantsbeyondconsiduingitasanerrororadeterioration ofcommunicationthatrequiresarepair (Laman, 1988) . However, the problem is not so much in finding a balance between reproductive and productive aspects of leaming and culture when these aspects are taken separately, but in fmding a description of the joint activity that keeps these aspects as a unity. The participatory concept of intersubjectivity as a coordination of individual contributions to the joint activity provides such a description. According to this concept, participants in the joint activity can diversify and/or unify their perspectives while contributing to the joint activity.
From the prospective that I propose, there is nothing wrong in studying agreement, growing consensus, or processes of unifying individual perspectives. However, it appears that a problem with the"~ng"approachariseswhenagreementorconsensusamong~eparticipantsofthejointactivity is seen as the definition of intersubjectivity and/or as the highest and best type of inter-subjectivity. In contrast, the participatory concept of intersubjectivity is defmed as a process of coordination of individual contributions to the joint activity rather than as a state of agreement between the participants (SmoIka, De Goes, & Fino, 1995) . The unit of analysis of intersubjectivity is joint activity (that defines individual conmbutions and their coordination) rather than individual perspectives a functions (Rogoff, 1990 , Wextsch, 1991 .
Analysis of children's cootdination around a class play has lead to my call for new methodologies that would involve ten planning sessions (10 days) over one month as a part of the school's reading/ writing workshop (sex Baker-Sennett, Matusov, & Rogoff, 1992) . While working on developing their own play on the basis of the traditional version of Snow White, children were involved in numerous disagreements and agreements with each other.
The children spent their first day disputing diffant versions of the traditional story of Snow W/tire rhat they had seen. With the help of the teacher, the group decided to modify the traditional fairy tale rather than to reconstruct it. Gn the second day, the children worked in close coIlaboration on a specific modification written by one of the girls, Robin,' at home and mainly based on the idea of making everything opposite to the traditional fairy tale (e.g., Srww While became Bhck Nighf, deer's heart became ant's heart, kiss became punch, the desire to be the prettiest became the &sire to be the ugliest) or to make everything weird (e.g.. poison apple became poison banana). The children tried to translate Robin's script into their own actions and lines and to check the logic of the events. The third playcrafting session started with an acute dispute and ended up with the children working in close collaboration. I focus on this third session because it helps to illustrate how disputes and close collaboration fueled one another and to illustrate how the micro-fabrics of dispute and close collaboration were based on both agreements and disagreements.
Dispute
Here I consider intersubjectivity at the macro-level. I try to demonstrate how the development and, especially, the resolution of the dispute in the third day of the children's playcrafting transcended children's individual understanding of ongoing situations and how this transcendence was important for the activity process and progress.
The dispute among the children at the beginning of the third session seemed to be pre-arranged by the second session when one of the girls, Stacy, was missing and the rest of the girls worked in close collaboration with each other and made great progress in their decision making and development of 34 Mind, Culture, and Activity Volume 3, No. 1 1996
. the new play, leaving the absent girl far behind them. On the third day, Stacy was back with the group (while another girl, Heather, was absent). For Stacy, her previous playcrafting session ended with the group's clear realirAon of the existence of two versions of the traditional Snav White and the group agreement to modify the play somehow. However, for therestof the group, their previous playcrafting session ended with agreeing to the specific modification proposed by Robin of making everything opposite, weird, and funny under the tentative title Block Night. This gap in the group experience created a "classical" dilemma for Stacy (see Deutsch, 1973; Shaa, 1987) : either "quietly" join the group process, accept the group decisions made in the second session without her, catch the logic of these decisions later and gradually through "peripheral" participation in the consecutive decision making process, or to "noisily" disrupt the group playcrafting and denounce the decisions made in her absence.
Stacy chose a disruption and was actively supported by Carol andindirectly supported by Kim, who said that she did not care which versionof the play they performed (these two girls seemed to have problems with the "reversed" logic ofBfuckNighr, but their concerns were oven-&d by the other girls, Robin and Le.&e, who were very excited about making everything opposite, weird, and funny). It was clear that Stacy's and Carol's (and Kim's, to some degree) synergy was sufficient to block the playcrafting process at the beginning of the third session.
The inherent nature of close collaboration among people is to differentiate people outside and inside the activity group. Collaboration allies people in a unique way. The clore collaboration of the group allied Robin and Leslee in their acceptance of the directions and solutions developed in the second session. The same process allied Stacy, Carol, and, to some degree, Rim in rejection of the directions of which they did not feel much ownership.
The point I am trying to make here is that the children perceived, stated, and attempted to resolve the dispute among themselves as a dispute about differences in their ideas about playcraftlng. However, the analysis of their discourse and activity on day three shows that the dispute was about ownership of the playcrafting process rather than about the preference for individual ideas. Moreover, the children did not have alternative ideas about the play but they acted us if they were stating and resolving a dispute over different ideas. This factually wrong assumption about the diversity of the ideas that the children held helped them to create conditions of a respectful inclusion for all the members into the group decision making process. I suggest that it would be difficult to understand the children's ambiguous discourse and its flow in the dispute if we assumed the traditional notion of intersubjectivity as overlapping individual goals, prolepses. and perceptions of the activity because meaningful dynamic patterns of the children's misunderstanding and miscommunication would be left out of the analysis. However, the participatory notion of intersubjectivity as coordination of participants' contributions allows us to see how children's discourse about difference in ideas contributed to and was shaped by coordination of their contributions in the dispute. In the following pages, I will demonstrate the evidence that was used to draw the inferences and conclusions presented here.
Excerpt #l. Developing and resolving a dispute.
The beginning of the third session. Robin, Stacy, Carol, Leslee, and Rim are sitting around the table. Heather is not there. They start off talking about the script Robin wrote. Leslee has just asked everyone who wanted to do Robin's script Most say they don't care. Leslee then explains that she (Robin) took a lot of time to write her script Stacy, having been absent for the last group discussion asks, "who?" Leslee then answers, "Robin, she wrote Night Black." Stacy begins an argument What is the evidence that the dispute was about ownership for the decision making and not about alternative ideas? Stacy seemed to propose two alternative ideas to Robin's modification of Snow Whire: 1) to perform the original Snav White (lines 6.9.12) and 2) to make everything "exactly opposite" (line 25). However, these alternatives were not serious. The idea of reconstruction of the traditional Snow White had been already rejected by the group, including Stacy-the reconstruction of the traditional fairy tale would put the group back to the familiar dispute of day one about different versions of Snow White they saw. (See Robin's critique of the reconstruction on line 7.) As to malting everything %rectly opposite," Robin's modification was aheady heavily based on malting everything opposite. When Robin suggested to write and then mix different ideas (lines 29.32.34, 37.39) . the Stacy-Carol coalition did not ptoduce alternative ideas since they seemed not to have any. The dispute was full of gaps between individual actions (e.g., Stacy's proposal for "alternative") and their contributions in the activity (blocking the group from building on the group decisions of day two). It seems that only L.eslee suspected that there were no alternatives to Robin's modification on the table (lines 26.38.41). However, it was Robin's suggestion (to mix ideas) based on misreading the situations--not Leslee's apparently correct interpretation of the situation-that led the group out of the dead end.
llms, in the absence of alternatives, the power of Robin's proposal to write and mix ideas was not a compromise6 of ideas between the Stacy-Carol and Robin-Leslee coalitions: there was no diversity of ideas, ratheran invitation of the Stacy-Carol coalition to joint decision making and shared ownership for the playcrafting. By doing that, Robin did not dismiss the group decisions made on the second day of playcrafting, but demonstrated that these decisions were not written in stone and revisions by the whole group were welcomed. This invitation forsharedownership of the playcrafting was accepted by the Stacy-Carol coalition and by Rim (lines 30, 33, 35, 40, 4245) and was finalized (and symbolized) in the change of the play title to Blue Night constructed jointly by the whole group (line 45). The dispute turned into close collaboration, the coalitions produced by the previous collaboration were dissolved.
Close Collaboration
The children spent the rest of the third playcrafting session working in close collaboration mainly on role distribution. Using this portion of the activity, I will focus on intersubjectivity at the micro-
lntersubjectiviry Without Agreement
Eugene h4atusov level and demonstrate that the fabric of this close collabcration was also full of both agreements and disagreements among the participants as well as other interesting forms of coordination. The children's role distribution was an important vehicle for developing and probing the play themes and considering the coo&u&on of actions and dialogue lines. As Robin real&d at the end of the session, 'We almost already have [a story]. When we just think of a part [i.e., a role], we think of a play." The children's co&&oration had a non-systematic progression involving intemtptions in the development of specific activity directions. I defme activity direction as a segment of the activity in which participants workedonacoherenttheme. As1 willtrytoshowbelow,thelackofsystematicity in progression of the activity directions or disjunctions of ideas within an activity direction do not indicate poor intersubjectivity. On the contrary, disjunctions and interruptions within activity directions and jumping and drifting between consecutive activity directions can (and did) constitute meaningful patterns of the activity progression. 'Ihe new notion of intersubjectivity as coordination shifts the focus of discourses and activity analysis from how well participants understand each other to what they contribute to the activity.
The following example, extracted from the middle of the session, consists of six consecutive activity directions involving role distribution (activity directions #l, #4, and #6), main events (#2), props (#3), and chiiracuxs' names (#4).
Excerpt #2. Close Collaboration on Role Distribution and Main Events
Activity direction #l: Deciding how many queens there would be in the play
In the excerpt (and throughout the children's close collabomtion), the group decision making process can be characterized as lacking systematic relations between the consecutive activity directions and by rather intensive integration of children's ideas within activity directions. Lines 9-21 are a good example of children's building on each other's ideas within the direction of considering a main event of the bad queen killing the good queen (direction #2). 7his integration and building on each other's ideas involved both agreements (e.g., lines [19] [20] and disagreements (lines [16] [17] among the children as well as elaborations (lines 14-15) and disjunctions. The disjunctions are referred to by Lemke (1995, p. 176) as relations among contexts that have gaps, discontinuity in themes, ideas, or approaches. Consider, for example, Robin's lines 17.19, and 21 where she tried to develop the scene of the bad queen hilling the good queen when the two queens were supposed to be played by one actor. The idea of one actor playing two queens and the idea of the bad queen killing the good queen are in disjunction with each other becauseof'the absence of certain contextuahxation" (Len&e, 1995, p. 176) (i.e.. being in connection and incompatible at the same time).
The transition from one direction of the activity to the next could be seen as idiosyncratic and arbitrary (for an observer) with regard to the previous direction. In some cases, such transition invoivedadialogue lineofonechildputinadifferentcontextby anotherchild(drifting). Forexample. Robin reinterprwd Stacy's justification for having one actor for two queens (line 9) as a shift to consideration of main events (see similar drifting transitions in lines 21-22 between directions #2 and #3 and in lines 30.31 between directions #3 and #4). In the other cases, the transition was abrupt (jumping) (see transitions in line 27 between directions #3 and # and in lines 36.38 between directions #5 and #6).
Drifting and jumping from one dire&on of the activity to another often could have a potential for both the exploration of possibilities for new goals and the exploration of ways of approaching them: but there is an accumulative progression in the activity. Although the group might not return immediately to the event or the direction they discussed previously (this is called "'denotationa.l discontinuity" by Wortham, 1995) . the children remembered their previous decisions (e.g.. Leslec in line 4 reminded the group of the previous decision malting) and used these decisions as "building blocks" in their playcrafting activity. During this jumping and drifting tirn one playcrafting issue to another one, the children covered a lot of playcrafting aspects. In a way, the playcrafting was done by the children in a mosaic fashion in a flexible and dynamic way without a pre-planned design.' This form of collaboration without systematic progression for playcrafting development was very sensitive to personal (e.g., who wants what roles) and contextual (e.g., incorporation of members of the group who missed the previous session into ongoing decision malting process) needs.
EventuaUy, the children employed collaboration with systematic progression in the activity as well. This way of collaborating involves acollaborativedecision making process that is characterized by a systematic transition from one activity direction to another. This systematic transition in the activity progression can have a "from global to local" structure (i.e., transitions from deciding global issuestospecifyingdetails)ora %om localtoglobal"structure,orsomeothetlinearand/oanon-linear types of structure. (See Kaplan (1966) on cultural patterns of systematic thought progression.) For example, the transition from direction #2 (lines 10-21). considering a main event of a bad queen hilling a good queen, to direction #3 (lines [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , wnsidering props for the knife that would kill the good queen, was systematic. It involved children's movement from aglobaldirection of considering main events to a local direction of considering details (props). Although collaboration with systematic 40 Mind, Cultun, and Activity Volume 3, No. 1 1996 progression seems to be more economic, collaboration with drifting-jumping types of progression seems to be more flexible.
What Have we Learned from the Playcrafting Example?
I examined the children's playcrafting session at three levels. The furs (macro) level involved transitions from one type of coo&t&ion of participants' contributions (e.g., a close collaboration during the second session) to another (e.g., a disputeat the beginning of the third session). We have leamedthatcollaborativedecisionsmadebythegroupnotonlyrmitedtheparticipantsbutalsocreated different based on the gradient of participation of group members in the decision making process. We also learned that one phase of coordination could pm-arrange the following phase. 'The second levelofouranaiysisinvolved transitionsbetweendirectionsoftheplaycraftingactivityinsideaphase. We saw that these transitions could have a systematic and/or a drifting-jumping pattem of activity progression. These types OfactivityprogressionwithinacooPdinationphasecouldprovide systematicity, economy, and flexibility for the activity and theparticipants. Thus, intersubjective flow can be both linearly systematic and mosaicly accumulative. The third (micro) level we touched upon, involves the relationship between and within participants' immediatecontributions within an activity direction. Wesawthatevenbuildingoneachother'sideasinciudedabn>adrangeofrelationssuchasagreements, disagreements, elaborations, and disjunctions. These relations constitute the process of meaning making and activity development In sum, I chose this particular example to illustrate the diversity and fluidity of the concept of intersubjectivity as weti as to show that coherent mutual understanding is not the only form of intersubjectivity and that other forms of intersubjectivity are worthwhile to study. Intersubjectivity might also include lack of agmement or continuity in activity progression. The evidence of sociocuhurai reactions and building on each other's contributions, which may involve jumping and driftingin themesandevendisagneing,ratherthanincreasingoverlapamongindividualsubjectiviti~.
I want to condude with rewording Rommetveit's (1979) important statement, "Intersubjectivity has in some sense to he taken for granted in order for it to be achieved. It is based in faith in a mutually shared world" (p.96). I would comment that, indeed, inteisubjectivity has to be taken for granted but it requires neither "faith in a mutually shared worid" nor constant suspicion of misunderstanding. Intersubjectivity among participants in a socioculturai activity is always there at some degree (see Fogel, 1993 , for morediscussion of low degree intersubjectivity), it does not need to beachieved The questtons are: wnat is mvolveu in tne process Of mtersuujecuvny, what aynanncs does it nave, ana how is this process embedded in bigger practices and community life? Notes I would like to thank Jackie Baker-Senne& Barbara Rogoff, Avril Thorne, Cathy Aqelillo, and Cindy White for their discussion of the paper.
contributions in a sociocultural activity. It again seems to overemphasize the integration type of coordination and de-emphasize discord among the participants ever in a case of division of labor and distriibuted cognition Another. and probably more promising, ahcmative for the tam "sh&rg" is "co-involvement" i.e., being involved with somebody in something. Star and Griesemer (1989) introduced the term 'boundary objects" that seems to lit this understanding of the tam "sharing" as "co-involvemu~" Boundary objects have comnum borders and different contents. 'Ibe notion emphasixes that the very same mat&al or symbolic object CXI have different functions and means for different participants. For example, rare animals of California were mainly objects of hum.ing, profit for v who Provided expositions for the museum, and objects for the study of ecological evolution for biologists who wae involved in developing the museum. Different contents of botmdary objects establish complex and dynamic mlationships betateen different communities involved in "shared' practices.
*The purpose of my critique is mu to invalidate the criticixed research-the studied phenomena are real, the inquiries are important-but to question methodology of the studies. focus, description& and explanations that they provide. I also want to express my appreciation of the criticixed appro=hdthough I disagree with them I acknowledge that they are important Part of my voice as being a background, a topic. and an addressee. s A four-year old immigrant from Russia is ready for pretend play about family with American preschools. whom he never saw before, despite the language and otha cultural barriers @sonal observation of my son).
'The names of the children and the teacher in this section are pseudonyms consistent with those used in Baker--Sennett. Matusov, and Rogoff (1992) .
J As Rogoff pointed out (Rogoff, pemonal communication, September, 1995) . it is an open question whether Robin indeed had misread the situa&m or this %isr&g" had been her political strategy to move the group ahead.Icouldnotfmdevidencetosup~ortorrejectanyofthesepossibilities(ortbeirmixture). Thesepossibilities can be also applied to the situations when a caregiver 'misreads" child's action as cultural signs or gesnxes, the caregiver does or does not use it as a teaching strategy or both. The effect of this behavior seems tobethesame with or without awareness of and active use by the actor (see Lock, 1980 for more discussion).
'The notion of compromise was suggested and supported by the teacha. See lines 20. 24.28. ami 32. 'Michacls and Caxden (1986) found that somewhat similar episodic structures, with emphasis on developing themes in studying African-Amuiurn children's narrative style, are used in "sharing time" in elementary school ChSSIO0lll.S.
